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This paper presents assessments of the economic impacts of free trade agreements 
(FTAs) relating to Japan. The analysis relies on a simulation with a computable equilibrium 
model. The impacts of various combinations of FTAs are assessed to draw policy 
implications. This paper first reviews the theoretical framework, together with the 
specifications of the simulation model. Then, simulations in the various cases cover both 
Japan’s bilateral FTAs and regional FTAs including Japan. The final section is a short 
summary of implications from the simulation work. 
RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of professional 
papers, thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are solely those of the 
author(s), and do not present those of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2 
 
1.  The Theoretical Framework and the Simulation Model Adopted 
(1)  Surveys on the Impacts of an FTA 
Welfare Decomposition of Efficiency Improvement 
A tariff reduction of an FTA has a wide variety of economic impacts on the member 
countries of the agreement, as well as the rest of the world. The effects encompass welfare, 
production, exports and imports in both real and nominal terms. On the effects on the welfare 
of the people, a survey by Baldwin and Venables (1995) demonstrated a comprehensive 
framework to decompose formally the impacts on the national welfare into six effects, based 
on an indirect utility function with respect to the consumption expenditure.
1 Assuming that all 
trade barriers give rise to rents only to domestic agents
2, one effect (trade cost effect) can be 
omitted from the six. Out of the remaining five effects, three effects (output effect, scale 
effect and variety effect) are only relevant in the models that allow for increasing returns to 
scale and imperfect competition.
3 These effects are important for analyzing the regional trade 
agreements between countries with similar industrial and trade structures, and where 
horizontal intra-industry trade is dominant, as between the United States and Canada and 
among the countries in the European Union. Because the percentage share of horizontal intra-
industry trade in total bilateral trade within the East Asian region is still low, we may limit 
our analysis to the remaining two effects only, namely, trade volume effects and terms of 
trade effects. Such treatment is also due to a lack of necessary data for simulating welfare 
effects under the increasing returns to scale. The welfare decomposition of trade volume 
effect in formal expression is shown in Appendix 1. 
Following the discussion above, the assumptions, mainly the constant returns to scale 
without significant product differentiation, enable us to limit the whole welfare change 
brought about by a tariff reduction under an FTA to only two effects: trade volume effect and 
terms of trade effect. The effects are in essence based on comparative statics, which merely 
takes the difference of the two statuses of variables in equilibrium. Some details of these two 
effects are as follows: 
Trade Volume Effect: This is essentially the change in tariff revenues, brought about by the 
changes in imports. As such, the effects in terms of income are obtained as the weighted 
average of existing tariff rates, using changes in the import volumes, as the weights.
4 This 
effect is closely related to the seminal study by Viner (1950) in which he classified the effects 
                                                      
1 The six effects consist of: trade volume effect, trade cost effect, terms of trade effect, output effect, scale 
effect and variety effect. 
2 In contrast, some trade barriers may be real trade costs incurred to the domestic agencies, or a quota 
under which foreigners capture the quota rents. 
3 The main reference on this theoretical application is Helpman and Krugman (1989). 
4 As Appendix 1 illustrates, the trade volume effects amount to tdm where t represents a vector of import 
tariffs and dm is the derivative of import vector. In the case of trade liberalization, the amount is 
approximately equal to the sum of two triangles of the dead-weight loss under tariff in the standard 
textbooks of trade theory, by means of the mean-value theorem. 3 
 
of the Customs Union
5 (CU) into two types: the trade creation and trade diversion effects. 
The sum of the two effects corresponds to the trade volume effect, producing ambiguous 
results on welfare. The trade diversion effect means reduced imports from non-FTA members, 
while trade creation effect means the increase in the sum of increased imports from 
FTA/CU.
6  Trade diversion results from discriminatory tariff reduction that leads private 
agents to import from a supplier that is not the lowest cost source. Therefore, trade diversion 
reduces home welfare by raising the nation’s cost of consuming such goods. If bilateral tariffs 
are reduced only on imports from countries that are already the lowest-cost supplier, trade 
diversion does not occur. FTAs/CUs are likely to be beneficial if the partners initially account 
for large shares of each other’s imports, as would be the case if they were low-cost producers. 
Terms of Trade Effect: Changes in the trade by Japan and other East Asian countries will 
probably induce changes in their border prices with consequent effects on welfare through the 
change of their terms of trade. If imports of the FTA members from the rest of the world 
decrease, then the terms of trade of the members of the FTA are likely to improve, and vice 
versa. The terms of trade effects are supposed to have ambiguous results in general, because 
an FTA may or may not bring expansion of intra-regional trade and contraction of external 
trade. It is necessary to test the effects by means of economic models by taking into account 
the complex structure of complementarities in trade and other factors. 
Location Effects and Regional Disparity 
Researchers have identified many of the effects of an FTA other than the static 
efficiency improvement. An important one is the location effect. There is a concern that 
regional integration may be associated with increased inequality between the regions. In a 
perfectly competitive environment, regional integration reduces intra-FTA factor price 
differences, as was proven in the “factor price equalization theorem”. As long as the 
countries’ endowments lie inside the same cone of diversification, integration will equalize 
factor prices, in the long run. For example, China and Japan have much different 
endowments, but the virtual integration of the countries will eventually increase the 
internationally traded goods and factors, which will increase the size of the cones of 
diversification. Actually, wages in China have been increasing rapidly, while those in Japan 
have declined. 
    Economic geography, recently drawing the attention of some economists, often 
assumes imperfect competition and scale economies, which sometimes imply reverse 
outcomes. Scale economies and economies of agglomeration mean that firms will not locate 
some productive capacity in every country or region. The decision of the firm depends on the 
balance between production costs and trade costs. This balance changes as trade barriers are 
reduced, and it is possible that industry will be drawn into high-wage locations, increasing 
inter-regional wage difference. Regional disparity has been a top concern of the Chinese 
government. The coastal region enjoyed high rates of growth, compared to the inland regions, 
                                                      
5 The Customs Union sets the common tariffs to the non-member countries, as well as abolishes the 
substantially all the tariffs between the members. 
6 According to Kowlczyk (1992), there are many other definitions of trade creation and diversion. 4 
 
which have lagged behind. In Japan, disparity among both people and regions has become a 
serious political issue. Relocation of production processes and reduction of employment have 
long taken place in several regions of Japan. Concern about regional disparity sometimes 
materializes as political pressure to resist FTAs. The location effects are something new to 
trade theory, and we still need to accumulate literature and empirical data. 
Other Dynamic Effects of an FTA on Economic Growth and Welfare 
In addition to the effects above, researchers have identified the effects on economic 
growth of trade liberalization under an FTA. The tariff reduction may provide an incentive: 
(i) to mobilize inputs and to improve their quality; (ii) to increase the efficiency of 
management through the increased pressure of competition (the “competition enhancing” 
effect); and (iii) to enhance technological innovation. Most of these effects are hypothetical, 
and empirical studies on the growth function have tested them by the panel data estimates. In 
addition, the economy of agglomeration, brought about the freer movement of production 
resources, may accelerate economic growth. At present, an economic model simulation may 
not be able to capture these effects. 
FTAs, especially the type of the economic partnership agreement (EPA) concluded by 
Japan, include many other liberalization and cooperation clauses in the agreements, such as 
liberalization in foreign direct investment, reduction of non-tariff barriers, protection of 
intellectual property rights, and industrial standardization. These apparently bring about many 
economic effects, some of which may be more significant than the tariff reduction. Some 
existing studies have tried to assess service sector liberalization and other trade cost reduction 
measures in FTAs/EPAs. Most of them rely on more or less arbitrary assumptions. Our study 
takes a model simulation approach and, as a result, is limited to the assessment of tariff 
reduction. 
(2)  Framework of the Adopted Simulation Model 
Computable Equilibrium Models and their Advantage 
In spite of the huge stock of theoretical literature, it is not empirically possible to 
construct a simulation model to assess quantitatively all the wide-ranging effects of an FTA 
under the present model technology and availability of required data. The following analysis 
adopts a simulation of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for assessing FTAs. A 
standard CGE model consists of equations of market demand and supply, market clearance 
conditions, as well as input-output relations, with a foundation in the microeconomic general 
equilibrium theory. The CGE model in its international version has its theoretical foundation 
in neo-classical trade theory. The pattern of comparative advantage explains the causes of and 
gains from trade on the basis of the relative differences between economies in factor 
endowments and production functions. By specializing in products that suit local conditions, 
and trading these for other goods that are produced with comparatively greater efficiency in 
other economies, each economy will have a higher real income and welfare than in the 
absence of trade. This is the basic motivation behind trade and explains its pattern in the 
world economy. 5 
 
In the framework, tariffs cause distortions in the markets that impede trade, and 
bring about losses of trade and welfare to the economies. Tariff elimination under an FTA is 
therefore understood as the removal of economic distortions. Tariff cuts lower import costs 
that lead to pushing down the import prices in the domestic markets under a competitive 
environment. The lower import prices stimulate imports in the short run. Cheaper imports, in 
turn, lead to lower production costs for other domestic industries. Relocation of labor and 
capital to other, more efficient sectors takes place from the formerly protected sectors, in the 
medium to long run. Improved competitiveness of the export industries, led by the relocation 
of resources and cheaper production costs, eventually increases the exports of the economy. 
After the adjustment process is completed, the nation may take more benefits from the trade, 
and production of the economy shifts toward sectors with comparative advantage. The static 
improvement of welfare through this efficiency gain is measured as trade volume effects, as 
indicated in the sub-section above. The model also measures the terms of trade effects on 
welfare. 
The CGE models have an apparent advantage of having multi-sector and multi-
country structure. They can identify a likely impact of an FTA on some sectors of some 
countries, as well as on a country and/or the world as a whole. This merit favorably 
distinguishes the CGE model from other macroeconomic models in the context of policy 
analysis. Another advantage of the CGE models is their concrete microeconomic foundation, 
which enables the modelers to rigorously assess the welfare changes. 
“Accumulation Effect” Measured by a CGE Model 
The CGE models are inherently designed to undertake comparative statics, skipping 
the intermediate process of market adjustment. On the effect of trade liberalization, the 
standard models can only measure the simple efficiency gains of recovering the dead weight 
loss. That notwithstanding, the model builders have tried to enable the models to assess the 
dynamic effects of trade liberalization, in addition to measure the efficiency gain / loss from 
external shocks. For example, recent models can incorporate a capital accumulation 
mechanism, which is induced by trade liberalization. This is the “accumulation effect” 
introduced in Baldwin (1992).
7 The mechanism, which is incorporated into the CGE model, 
is as follows: increased incomes caused by enhanced efficiency of the economy lead to 
increased savings, and the increased savings induce an increase in investment, and such an 
increase continues until the increased capital stock requires a larger amount of capital 
depreciation to balance the net investment. As such, the model measures the accumulation 
effects as medium-term transient, rather than the increase in long-term growth rates. 
Appendix 2 provides a detailed explanation on the specification. Our study adopts the 
specification because of its greater reality. 
  The accumulation effect of the Baldwin specification is measured by comparing one 
set of variables to another, both on the long-run growth paths. Therefore, the model does not 
trace and identify the dynamic path in the transition period. However, the order and sequence 
of the choice of FTA partners, which reflect the transitional path, significantly matters in the 
                                                      
7 Baldwin (1992) termed the same effects “dynamic gains.” 6 
 
context of policy. Moreover, the Baldwin specification has a semi-linear nature, which 
precludes the path-dependency of the final results. But the political consideration often 
requires the assessment of the difference of the final outcomes, brought about by the 
sequence of the possible FTAs. As such, “real” dynamic models are desired for the policy 
analysis. In this paper, several cases of combination of the FTAs concerning Japan are 
simulated to illustrate the transition as a compromise. In addition, our study uses a Dynamic 
GTAP, which is a dynamic recursive CGE model. 
The Global Trade Analysis Project Model 
Our study uses the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model version 6.2, and its 
database version 6.0, provided by Purdue University. The original database consists of 87 
regions and 57 industrial sectors, which are aggregated for the study into 24 regions and 25 
sectors. Appendix 3 summarizes the aggregation with abbreviation. The GTAP model 
provides the Baldwin accumulation specification as a standard option. 
One of the specific features of the GTAP model is the Armington structure, which 
sets the fixed elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods due to changes 
in the relative price of those two goods
8   (see Armington [1969]). The incomplete 
substitutability between the imported and domestic goods, because of the international 
product discrimination, implies the finite elasticity. The Armington structure significantly 
simplifies the model. 
The Plan for Simulations in this Paper 
The rest of this paper plans to make CGE model simulations on the effects of tariff 
reduction and elimination under the possible FTAs. The static model with the Baldwin 
accumulation specification is employed to assess Japan’s three existing FTAs. 
 
2.  The Simulations of Japan’s Existing and Future Bilateral FTAs 
Trade and Tariff Structures of the Three Countries of Japan’s Existing FTAs 
  As of now, Japan has three FTAs
9; with Singapore (effective November 2002), 
Mexico (effective April 2005) and Malaysia (effective July 2006). There have been FTA 
negotiations with several countries/region, including the Philippines, Thailand, Korea, 
Indonesia, Chile and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole.  
As for Japan’s imports, the sector shares of the amounts of import and tariff rates in 
Japan are summarized in Table 1. Japan imported from Singapore and Malaysia mainly the 
products of mining and manufactures, and almost no amounts of agriculture, forestry and 
                                                      
8 This elasticity is known as Armington elasticity. 
9 The Japanese government has tried to make its EPAs standard bilateral agreements that include all 
the typical components of an FTA, as well as additional agreements on economic cooperation and 
liberalization measures. 7 
 
fisheries. The imports from Mexico included about 10 percent of livestock, and six percent of 
crops. 
Table 1: Sector Shares of Imports and Tariffs of Japan (percent) 
Import Share Tariff Rates Import Share Tariff Rates Import Share Tariff Rates
GRN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 967.1
CROP 0.1 1.6 6.1 3.0 0.5 0.2
LSK 0.0 119.2 9.3 62.7 0.0 9.0
FRS 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
FSH 0.1 3.4 2.8 3.9 0.4 3.2
MNG 23.1 0.0 17.2 3.1 33.7 0.0
FDP 4.6 20.8 1.8 8.5 2.8 3.7
TEX 0.0 8.6 0.2 6.1 0.5 4.1
WAP 0.1 15.4 1.3 11.8 0.5 6.6
CHM 11.3 1.8 3.0 0.2 7.5 0.2
MET 6.4 0.4 7.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
MVH 0.1 0.0 10.3 0.0 0.3 0.0
OTN 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ELE 24.2 0.0 10.6 0.0 25.7 0.0
OME 28.9 0.1 22.5 0.0 11.3 0.0
OMF 0.8 0.5 7.6 0.4 13.5 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Singapore Mexico Malaysia
 
1.  See Appendix 3 for the abbreviation of sectors. 
2.  Import shares are made from the Customs Statistics of Japan, 2006. 
3.  Tariff rates are taken from the GTAP database, based on the 2001 data. 
 
Japan’s import tariffs before the FTAs, which may have reflected the most favored 
nation (MFN) treatments, had very similar structures across the three countries. The import 
tariff rates of agriculture and FDP (processed food) are higher
10, while those of mining and 
manufacturing are lower. Among manufacturing, TEX (textiles) and WAP (apparel) have 
comparatively higher tariffs, and many of the other manufacturing sectors have zero or 
minimal tariffs. Tariff elimination under Japan’s FTAs would bring about almost no change 
in the effective tariffs in most of manufacturing sectors, except for FDP, TEX and WAP. 
These, together with agriculture, are the key sectors for the FTAs. 
The sector shares of Japan’s bilateral exports and the tariff rates of the three FTA 
partners are summarized in Table 2. Japan exported virtually no products of agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries. The main export items are all manufacturing goods. Among them, 
                                                      
10 As the GTAP tariff rates are the effective tariff rates, calculated from the sector-base tariff revenue 
divided by the import amounts, the imports of GRN (grain), almost all the imports which were 
quantitatively restricted without tariff payments have entries of zero percent in Singapore and 
Malaysia. The similar backgrounds apply to the different tariff rates in LSK (livestock). 8 
 
ELE (electronic equipment), OME (other manufactured equipment), MET (metal products), 
MVH (motor vehicles) lead Japan’s exports. ELE invariably takes the top share. 
Table 2: Sector Shares of Imports and Tariffs of Japan’s FTA Partners 
(percent) 
Import Share Tariff Rates Import Share Tariff Rates Import Share Tariff Rates
GRN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CROP 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.0 1.3
LSK 0.1 0.0 0.0 22.7 0.0 8.8
FRS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FSH 0.1 0.0 0.0 17.0 0.0 0.1
MNG 1.7 0.0 0.0 12.9 0.3 0.1
FDP 0.3 1.3 0.0 20.5 0.1 10.3
TEX 0.4 0.0 0.2 18.2 0.7 10.5
WAP 0.1 0.0 0.0 30.8 0.1 15.0
CHM 8.5 0.0 3.5 14.8 10.0 7.7
MET 13.2 0.0 11.6 14.1 19.8 12.0
MVH 6.9 0.0 31.5 16.7 10.0 45.4
OTN 5.7 0.0 0.0 25.9 0.6 14.8
ELE 35.9 0.0 37.4 7.9 36.4 0.1
OME 25.4 0.0 14.8 12.9 19.8 3.8
OMF 1.8 0.0 0.9 18.1 2.0 11.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Singapore Mexico Malaysia
 
1.  See Appendix 3 for sector abbreviations. 
2.  Import shares are derived from the Customs Statistics of Japan in 2006. 
3.  Tariff rates are taken from the GTAP database, based on the 2001 data. 
 
The import tariffs of the three countries from Japan sharply contrast each other. 
Singapore has virtually no import tariff. Mexico levies comparatively high tariff rates, 
particularly on WAP (apparel) and OTN (other transport equipment).  The import tariff of 
Malaysia is particularly high in MVH (motor vehicles), but the tariff rates of the other sectors 
are lower than Mexico. Protection of the automobile industry is a common policy in 
developing countries in Asia, as well as in Mexico. 
Details of the Simulations and Technical Assumptions 
The simulation is implemented by applying external shocks to the model, and 
measures the impacts from the changes of the values of model variables. In this study, the 
external shocks are the reduction and elimination of the import tariff rates agreed upon in the 
existing FTAs. Four technical points deserve note. 
1.  The GTAP database reflects the effective tariff rates in 2001. The FTA partners may 
have changed the tariff rates between the year 2001 and the time of enforcement of 
the FTA. The simulation should measure the impacts of changes of the tariff rates 9 
 
between the periods of agreed upon and implemented points. In this study, the 
possible changes after 2001 are ignored, because no major multilateral or regional 
initiatives to liberalize trade took place for that period, except for the tariff reduction 
committed to in China’s WTO accession, which is taken into account in the related 
simulations. 
2.  The targeted tariff rate specified by the FTAs may be lower than, equal to, or even 
higher than the existing concession rate, because the existing rates may be the 
concession rates of the MNF treatment made after the WTO agreement, which is 
lower than the FTA concession rates.
11 Our observation on the import shares and 
existing and target tariff rates of the items implies that the tariff reduction under the 
existing FTAs may bring about virtually no tariff reduction in agriculture, fisheries, 
forestry, and food-related manufacturing (FDP) in Japan, compared to the MFN 
concession rates. In contrast, assuming zero tariff rates of Japan under FTAs provides 
a good estimate for mining and manufacturing. 
3.  The existing FTAs often allowed for grace periods and scheduling in the reduction of 
tariff rates of specific items, often over the subsequent 10 years. In this study, the 
transition periods are ignored, and the simulation shocks simply assume the total 
change of target rates. The three FTA partners are committed to eliminate most of the 
tariffs by the end of the transition period, except for Mexico’s LSK (livestock), FSH 
(fishery), FDP (processed food), and WAP (apparel), for which tariff rates will be 
reduced, but not to zero. 
4.  The simulation model specifies the Baldwin dynamic closure, as illustrated in the 
previous section in this paper. The simulation under the specification generally 
produces larger amounts of impacts in terms of welfare and product. 
Table 3 below summarizes the expected percentage changes in the import tariff rates under 
the FTAs, as the shocks to the simulation. Japan will cut the tariffs on TEX and WAP rather 
significantly, by 5 to 15 percentage points, but will make virtually no change in tariffs for the 
other sectors, except for minor reductions in CHM, MET and OMF. Singapore, because of 
the virtually zero rates of existing tariffs, will not change any tariffs, except for a minor 
reduction in FDP. Mexico and Malaysia were committed to abolishing all tariffs by the end of 
the FTA schedules. 
Table 3: Shocks to the Import Tariff under Japan’s FTAs 
(percent changes) 
                                                      
11 To compare the FTA target rates and the existing concession rates, we classified the import items of 
Japan on the HS two-digit basis into the following for categories: (i) excluded (the FTA does not 
change the existing tariff rate); (ii) minimal (the FTA reduces the tariff rates of less than three tariff 
lines [on the six-digit basis] within the two-digit item); (iii) most (the FTA reduces the tariff rates of 
more than or equal to three tariff lines [on the six-digit basis] within the two-digit item); and (iv) all 
(the FTA eliminates all the tariff lines [on the six-digit basis] within the two-digit item). 10 
 
Japan Singapore Japan Mexico Japan Malaysia
GRN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CROP 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.5 0.0 -1.3
LSK 0.0 0.0 0.0 -11.3 0.0 -8.8
FRS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FSH 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.5 0.0 -0.1
MNG 0.0 0.0 0.0 -12.9 0.0 -0.1
FDP 0.0 -1.3 0.0 -13.6 0.0 -10.3
TEX -8.6 0.0 -6.1 -18.2 -4.1 -10.5
WAP -15.4 0.0 -11.8 -20.5 -6.6 -15.0
CHM -1.8 0.0 -0.2 -14.8 -0.2 -7.7
MET -0.4 0.0 0.0 -14.1 0.0 -12.0
MVH 0.0 0.0 0.0 -11.1 0.0 -45.4
OTN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -25.9 0.0 -14.8
ELE 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.9 0.0 -0.1
OME -0.1 0.0 0.0 -12.9 0.0 -3.8
OMF -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -18.1 -2.6 -11.2
JSEPA JMxEPA JMsEPA
 
1.  See Appendix 3 for sector abbreviations. 
 
Macroeconomic Impacts 
  The macroeconomic impacts of the simulations of the CGE models are usually 
summarized in the changes in the real gross domestic product (GDP) and equivalence of 
variation (EV). Both reflect the efficiency improvement. The EV measures the income-based 
welfare improvement, theoretically explained in Appendix 1. The measure means the 
recovery of the dead-weight loss. Table 4 shows the simulation results. 
 
 
Table 4: Macroeconomic Impact of Japan’s FTAs 
(GDP in percent change, EV in US$ million) 
 11 
 
GDP EV GDP EV GDP EV
AUS 0.00 -1 0.00 2 -0.01 -32
NZL 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0
CHN 0.00 -5 0.00 -71 0.00 -69
HKG 0.00 0 0.00 -15 0.02 25
JPN 0.00 -2 0.02 1286 0.02 1017
KOR 0.00 -1 -0.01 -61 -0.01 -63
TWN 0.00 -1 -0.02 -69 -0.01 -67
IDN 0.00 -1 -0.01 -18 -0.03 -47
MYS 0.00 -2 -0.03 -39 1.41 862
PHL 0.00 -1 -0.06 -43 -0.04 -24
SGP 0.02 26 -0.02 -18 -0.01 -26
THA 0.00 -1 -0.05 -55 -0.04 -53
VNM 0.00 -1 0.00 0 0.00 1
XSE 0.00 0 0.01 6 0.01 8
IND 0.00 -1 0.00 12 0.00 0
XSA 0.00 0 0.00 -5 0.01 6
CAN 0.00 -1 0.01 50 0.00 11
USA 0.00 -11 0.00 -408 0.00 139
MEX 0.00 -2 0.60 2837 0.01 57
PER 0.00 0 0.01 7 0.01 5
CHL 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1
EU15 0.00 -12 0.00 206 0.00 139
RUS 0.00 -1 0.00 21 0.00 1
ROW 0.00 -6 0.00 55 0.00 58




1.  See Appendix 3 for region abbreviations. 
2.  Author’s simulation, using GTAP database and GEMPACK. 
 
Three major points characterize the simulation result. First, the FTA members, Japan 
and its FTA partners, tend to gain GDP and EV, and many of the other regions lose them. 
This results from the trade diversion effect. The non-member regions will have the FTA 
members import their products less, and they will be induced to produce less the goods of the 
sectors with comparative advantage. The trade diversion effect should also take place among 
the FTA members, but the trade creation effect outweighs the trade diversion effects. Second, 
Mexico and Malaysia will gain a larger percentage of GDP, but Japan and Singapore will 
gain little. Theoretically, the countries that reduce the tariffs more will generally gain more. 
Mexico and Malaysia will reduce tariffs by greater percentage, but the tariff reduction of 
Singapore and Japan will be smaller. The existing tariff rates of Singapore are virtually zero. 
Japan will maintain the high tariff in agriculture and only reduced the existing tariff rates in 
limited sectors, i.e. TEX and WAP. Third, the EV in the world generally adds up to positive 
numbers. The FTAs will increase the welfare in the world, albeit in small amounts. 
Impacts on Sectors 12 
 
  The CGE model simulation can assess the impacts on the sectors in each economy. 
The impacts on sector production would interest more the domestic groups than the 
macroeconomic impacts would. Generally, the sectors protected by high tariff rates will lose 
their production more when the tariffs are reduced under an FTA. While the trade 
liberalization brings about efficiency gains to increase in income and production across the 
sectors, the income gains and resulting demand increase will not generally offset the decrease 
of the production of the losing sectors. Table 5 illustrates the impacts on the production of the 
sectors. 
Table 5: Impacts on the Industry Sectors of Japan’s FTAs 
(percents) 
Total
Japan Singapore Japan Mexico Japan Malaysia Japan
GRN 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
CROP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1
LSK 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2
FRS 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.0 2.2 -0.1
FSH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0
MNG 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1
FDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0
TEX 0.0 0.8 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 3.6 -0.4
WAP 0.0 4.7 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 3.7 -0.3
CHM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1
MET 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.5
MVH 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.9 0.3 3.8 0.2
OTN 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 1.7 -0.5
ELE 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 -0.4 2.4 -0.3
OME 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.1 -0.1 2.9 0.1
OMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 3.6 0.0
EGW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 1.2 0.1
CNS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 2.2 0.1
TRD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.0
TRS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.0
CMN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.0
FIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.3 0.0
PRS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.0
OFS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0
DWE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.1
JSEPA JMxEPA JMsEPA
 
1.  See Appendix 3 for region abbreviations. 
2.  Author’s simulation, using GTAP database and GEMPACK. 
 
The impacts on the production of the industrial sectors for Japan are generally small 
in terms of percentage, less than 0.5 percent throughout the sectors. Singapore will receive 
some positive impact only on the production of WAP. In contrast, many sectors in Mexico 
and Malaysia will face larger impacts in terms of percentage changes. For Mexico, all the 13 
 
industrial sectors will be “the winners,” and the largest gains in terms of percentage will go to 
ELE, OME and MVH. For Malaysia, GRN, CROP and LSK are “the losers”, but the loss will 
be less than 0.5 percent. All the other sectors in Malaysia will increase the production, 
particularly some manufacturing, such as MVH, TEX, WAP and OMF. The difference of the 
percentage changes between Japan and its FTA partners should reflect the magnitude of the 
economies, as well as the scales of the tariff reductions. The column of total, adding the 
impacts of the three FTAs, in Table 5 indicates that Japan will receive comparatively small 
impacts in terms of percentage change in the production in the industrial sectors. 
The GTAP database includes an input-output table which simply mixes the imported 
and domestically produced intermediates. In the model, all the exports from an FTA member 
to another can enjoy the tariff concession, even if the local contents of such exports are very 
low. In reality, however, the rules of origin (ROO) clauses in the FTAs may possibly block 
the concession to such exports.
12 ROOs may function as trade protection measures when a 
country establishes numerous overlapping FTAs. This issue is essential in the case of the 
regional FTAs which are expected to function to extend the regional production networks, but 
the bilateral FTAs also suffer from them. The effects from the efficiency improvement 
assessed by the GTAP model, therefore, should be possibly overestimated. 
 
3. Simulations of the Future Scenarios of Japan’s FTAs 
The objective of this section is to assess the scenarios of Japan’s future FTAs, making 
comparisons between these multiple scenarios. This section contains two groups of 
simulation works. The first group covers the static simulations on the effects of the FTAs 
relating to Japan. They are static in the sense that they measure the ultimate impacts of the 
FTAs without following their time paths. The second group covers the dynamic simulation by 
using the Dynamic GTAP model to assess Japan’s FTAs. 
Static Simulation 
The first group undertakes simulations on: 
(1) Japan’s bilateral FTAs with possible future FTA partners. Such potential FTA 
partners and their combinations may include: (i) the remaining ASEAN 8 
countries (ASEAN10 except for Singapore and Malaysia); (ii) China and Korea; 
(iii) ASEAN10 countries plus China and Korea; and (iv) ASEAN 10 countries 
plus China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India. The simulations assess only 
the effects of the combinations of Japan’s bilateral FTAs, not the effects brought 
about by the regional FTAs which assume the FTAs between the counterparts of 
Japan. 
                                                      
12 Preferential trade agreements, including FTAs, require ROOs to enable a given trade good to be 
identified as originating in the area covered by the agreement, and thus subject to exemption from 
customs duties. ROOs exist to prevent imports from countries outside the scope of the agreement 
from taking advantage of the concessions of FTAs. Such imports are knows as trade deflection. 14 
 
(2) Regional FTAs including Japan as a member or major FTAs in the East Asia in 
the future. Such potential regional FTAs include: (i) ASEAN10 countries; (ii) 
China, Japan and Korea: (iii) ASEAN10 plus 3 (China, Japan and Korea); and (iv) 
ASEAN10 plus six (China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India). 
The simulations above adopt basically the same methodology as in the former section of 
Japan’s three existing FTAs, i.e. the static model with the Baldwin accumulation 
specification. 
Three points on the assumptions and model structures deserve to note. First, the 
simulation shocks for Japan’s bilateral FTAs are such that its FTA partners will abolish all 
tariffs for Japan, and that Japan will abolish its tariffs for the partner in all sectors except 
agriculture, fishery, forestry, and processed food. This asymmetrical assumption reflects the 
past experiences in Japan’s three existing FTAs. In contrast, the regional FTAs assume, as the 
hypothetical simulation shocks, that all the parties, including Japan, will reduce the tariff 
rates to zero in all the sectors. 
Second, it should be reiterated, as in the former section, that ROOs may significantly 
curtail the merits of the concession under the regional FTAs by preventing the free movement 
of materials in the regional production networks. The GTAP simulation, which assumes 
simple preclusion of the existence of ROOs, may overestimate the impacts. 
Third, the GTAP model simulations cannot measure the scale merits from the 
formation of regional production networks and the economy of agglomeration, which may 
result from the region-wide multiple FTAs. Therefore, the simulations may underestimate the 
impacts. The GTAP simulations also ignore the possible effects of the FTAs to stimulate 
technological progress through promoting competition; i.e. pro-competitive effects. 
Fourth, rather technically, China significantly reduced the tariff rates of many sectors 
as a commitment to its accession to the WTO after 2001. Thus the tariff rates of the GTAP 
database are based on the data in the year 2001, and the GTAP tariff database is updated by 
incorporating the WTO commitment. 
Results of Static Simulation 
Table 6 below summarizes the welfare gains from the potential bilateral and regional 
FTAs. The equivalence of variation (EV) is used as the measure of the welfare improvement.  
 
 
Table 6: Welfare Gains from the FTA Scenarios 












AUS -30 -78 -153 -224 340 -9 -420 -586 8,105
NZL 0 2 -28 -24 129 -15 -46 -72 851
CHN -145 -621 2,965 2,358 2,163 -329 4,789 6,186 6,906
HKG 10 47 -115 -66 -115 85 -237 -79 -163
JPN 2,301 4,094 5,707 9,838 12,161 -262 5,398 10,332 12,433
KOR -125 -400 628 237 71 -199 14,163 15,944 18,007
TWN -137 -336 -668 -978 -1,093 -151 -779 -1,516 -1,843
IDN -67 1,099 -274 763 706 1,167 -264 3,519 4,078
MYS 822 827 -209 600 555 1,498 -242 3,236 4,224
PHL -67 412 -223 163 111 909 -207 1,562 1,676
SGP -18 -47 -188 -233 -304 2,143 -199 3,068 3,508
THA -110 3,698 -393 3,170 3,005 3,271 -504 10,156 10,209
VNM 0 440 -139 189 180 220 -240 1,724 1,726
XSE 14 211 -61 149 135 472 18 719 492
IND 11 -108 -160 -253 352 -65 -57 -388 4,291
XSA 0 -26 -99 -120 -125 -21 -72 -183 -323
CAN 60 21 -62 -33 -62 68 27 156 -6
USA -280 -253 -2,387 -2,462 -3,106 679 -1,158 -544 -2,340
MEX 2,892 30 -173 -117 -107 75 492 762 768
PER 12 -6 -42 -45 -52 -19 -31 -78 -135
CHL 0 3 -43 -38 -40 13 -80 -89 -126
EU15 332 18 -2,111 -1,919 -2,597 636 170 1,658 333
R U S 2 2- 7 - 1 3 5 - 1 3 7 - 1 6 76 81 59 4 3 5
ROW 107 -123 -1,203 -1,254 -1,803 507 -343 367 -1,248
World 5,603 8,898 434 9,566 10,336 10,742 20,193 55,947 71,457
Patners of Japan's Bilateral FTAs Regional FTAs
 
1. See Appendix 3 for region abbreviations. 
2. Author’s simulation, using GTAP database and GEMPACK. 
3. Japan’s existing  FTAs consist of those with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia. 
4. Japan’s bilateral FTAs assume all bilateral tariff rates become zero except for agriculture, fisheries, 
forestry, and processed food. Regional FTAs assume all members of the regional FTAs eliminate all 
tariffs in all sectors. 
 
  In all the cases, Japan invariably gains welfare from its own bilateral FTAs. The 
welfare gain of Japan expands as the number of its bilateral FTAs increases. The welfare gain 
of Japan from the existing three FTAs in total will be much smaller than those from the FTAs 
with China and Korea, and ASEAN10 countries. In particular, the FTAs with ASEAN10+5 
(China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India) will bring about welfare gain of more than 
five times the three existing FTAs. As a standard concern on the preferential trade 
agreements, Japan’s bilateral FTAs tend to bring about welfare loss to the third countries. 
This is due to the trade diversion effect. In particular, the case of the combination of Japan-
China and Japan-Korea FTAs will reduce the total amount of economic welfare of the world, 
while other cases will not. In this case, even Korea will lose welfare, because of the 
aggravated terms of trade. 
  For the simulation cases of the regional FTAs including Japan, countries that are 
members of a regional FTA invariably gain welfare. The magnitude of welfare gains to the 
members expands as the members of the regional FTA increase. The largest-scaled regional 
FTA by ASEAN10+6 will bring about the largest amount of welfare gains to the members, as 16 
 
well as the world in total. However, the welfare loss to the non-member countries also 
expands, due to the more serious trade diversion. 
Dynamic Simulations: Model Structures and Assumptions 
  This sub-section assesses the time series impacts of various scenarios for Japan’s 
FTAs in the future by means of a dynamic recursive general equilibrium model, namely the 
Dynamic GTAP (GTAP-Dyn). The model is essentially the same as the standard GTAP 
model, but it explicitly incorporates foreign asset ownership and an investment mechanism. 
As a result, the model simulation can follow the capital accumulation process in a recursive 
manner (for detail, see Ianchovichina and McDougall [2000]). The aggregation of the region 
and industry sectors is 18 times 10, reducing the scale of the model to ensure the stable 
convergence of the model simulation. 
  Table 7 below summarizes the baseline scenario of Japan’s future FTAs, together 
with alternative scenarios. The baseline scenario assumes that the FTAs presently under 
negotiation will be concluded and their effects will materialize in or before 2010 to 2013. The 
FTA with New Zealand will be put in place in the  period between 2014 and 2017, and those 
with China and remaining ASEAN members will be between 2018 and 2020. 
Table 7: Scenarios of Japan’s Future FTAs 
Baseline Expedite FTAs


























































The major alternative scenarios are (i) expediting FTAs with New Zealand, China and 
ASEAN10+5 to the period between 2010 and 2013; (ii) forming an FTA with the United 
States; (iii) liberalizing agriculture and related industries in the FTAs under the baseline 
scenario; and (iv) liberalizing agriculture and related industries and forming an FTA with the 17 
 
United States. The periods of the Table indicate the approximate time when the price and 
quantitative adjustment brings about the impacts of the FTAs. 
  The simulations assume the following assumptions: 
1.  In the baseline scenario, the FTA partners of Japan will eliminate bilateral tariffs in all 
sectors to Japan, and Japan will do so except for agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and 
processed food. In contrast, in the Agriculture Liberalization scenarios (scenario III and 
IV), Japan will eliminate tariffs in all the sectors including these. The comparison of these 
scenarios, therefore, demonstrates the effects of the protection of these food-related 
sectors. 
2.  Detailed information on tariff reduction schedules in the future is available only in the 
existing FTAs with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia. The simulation for these FTAs 
reflects the scheduled future tariff rate reductions. For the other FTAs, however, the tariff 
rates are simply assumed to be reduced to zero at the periods indicated in Table 7. 
3.  The dynamic simulation will measure the deviations of the values of the model variables 
between that of an economic situation along the assumed future baseline growth path 
without any policy shocks and that with the tariff reductions under the FTA scenarios. 
The assumed future growth path is not critically important, because the simulated impacts 
of the trade policy reflect only the differences of the variables, and their levels will be 
cancelled out. 
The Results of Dynamic Simulation: Baseline Scenario 
The simulation result of the Baseline Scenario is summarized in Table 8 below. The 
Table uses the GDP as a measure of the effects, not the EV. This is partly due to the fact that 
the Dynamic GTAP measures the welfare of the nations both incomes from domestic 
production and incomes generated from overseas investment. Trade liberalization policies, 
such as an FTA, may improve domestic efficiency which will attract foreign investment in 
the short and medium run. However, the accumulated investment inflows will result in 
increased payments back to abroad as the remittance of investment incomes in the future. The 
GDP measure will avoid such complication to assess the impacts of FTAs, although the GDP 
measures also indirectly reflect the mechanism. 18 
 
Table 8: Baseline Scenario: Impacts of Japan’s Future FTAs 
(percentage of real GDP) 
2006 - 2009 2010 - 2013 2014 - 2017 2018 - 2020 static result
AUS -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.25
NZL -0.01 -0.10 -0.17 -0.08 0.32
CHN -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.31
HKG 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
JPN 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.21
KOR -0.03 0.12 0.35 0.34 0.31
IDN -0.01 0.38 0.86 0.88 0.61
MYS 0.35 1.21 1.45 1.42 1.16
PHL 0.30 0.86 2.86 3.27 0.51
SGP -0.08 -0.28 -0.32 -0.32 -0.29
THA 1.11 5.16 5.40 4.49 4.23
XSE 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.60
IND -0.02 0.10 0.42 0.63 0.27
CAN 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
USA 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
MEX 0.07 0.22 0.28 0.26 -0.03
EU15 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03
ROW -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05  
1. See Appendix 3 for region abbreviations. 
2. Author’s simulation, using GTAP database, GTAP-Dyn and GEMPACK. 
  3. Calculated as the deviation from an assumed growth path without policy shocks. 
  Generally, the FTA will bring about net positive impacts to both Japan and its FTA 
partners, except for China, Singapore and New Zealand. The existing tariffs of China and 
New Zealand are comparatively  low and they will suffer from trade diversion effects from 
Japan’s other FTAs, leading to the negative net impacts. China will also face negative net 
impacts on its GDP, but the impacts will become smaller in the period of 2018 – 2020. Non-
member countries will generally suffer from Japan’s FTAs. 
The results of the dynamic and static simulations are generally comparable in the 
period of 2018 - 2020, except for New Zealand, China and Mexico. The simulated impacts on 
the GDP of New Zealand and China by the dynamic model are slightly negative, but those by 
the static model are positive; around 0.3 percent. The major difference of the model is the 
simulated investment process with international capital mobility. Both countries, as 
latecomers, will suffer from capital outflows brought about by Japan’s other FTAs before 
they form their FTAs with Japan. 
The positive impacts on Japan increase over time, as the number of its FTAs increases. 
Malaysia and Mexico, as their tariff reductions are scheduled periodically, also receive 
increasing positive impacts. Other countries will generally enjoy the largest positive impacts 
when they conclude FTAs with Japan. 
 19 
 
Alternative Scenarios: Expediting Forming Japan’s FTAs 
  The second scenario represents the case in which Japan forms FTAs more rapidly (see 
Table 7).  Under this scenario, the counterparts are to conclude FTAs with Japan in the period 
of 2010 – 2013. Table 9 below summarizes the impact on regions’ GDPs. 
Table 9: Alternative Scenario: Expediting FTAs 
Impacts of Japan’s Future FTAs (percentage of real GDP) 
2006 - 2009 2010 - 2013 2014 - 2017 2018 - 2020 static result
AUS -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.25
NZL -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.32
CHN -0.01 0.14 0.33 0.35 0.31
HKG 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06
JPN 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.21
KOR -0.03 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.31
IDN -0.01 0.41 0.92 0.93 0.61
MYS 0.35 1.18 1.37 1.35 1.16
PHL 0.30 0.81 2.55 2.98 0.51
SGP -0.08 -0.32 -0.41 -0.41 -0.29
THA 1.11 5.10 5.14 4.23 4.23
XSE 0.00 0.17 0.31 0.32 0.60
IND -0.02 0.10 0.41 0.62 0.27
CAN 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
USA 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
MEX 0.07 0.22 0.28 0.27 -0.03
EU15 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03
ROW -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05  
1. See Appendix 3 for region abbreviations. 
2. Author’s simulation, using GTAP database, GTAP-Dyn and GEMPACK. 
  3. Calculated as the deviation from an assumed growth path without policy shocks. 
  In the alternative scenarios, the simulated impacts become similar to those of the 
static simulation. The impact on Japan will be almost the same. In contrast, China will 
receive a larger positive benefit in the alternative scenarios than in the baseline scenario. The 
earlier FTA with Japan will improve economic efficiency in China during the early stage, 
leading to more inflow of capital and investment at the end. This case underscores the 
importance of timing. The same discussion applies in the case of New Zealand and other 
ASEAN countries (XSE). 
Alternative Scenarios: An FTA with the US and Liberalizing Agriculture 
  The third scenario (Scenario III) represents the case in which Japan forms an FTA 
with the United States in the period of 2014 – 2017. The fourth scenario (Scenario IV) will 
make Japan eliminate the tariff of the sectors of the agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and 
processed food, with other assumptions the same as the baseline. The fifth scenario (Scenario 
V) is the combination of the fourth and fifth, assuming both liberalization of agriculture and 20 
 
the related sectors and forming an FTA with the United States. The following Table 10 
summarizes the impacts on the GDP of the region under the third, fourth and fifth scenarios 
in the period of 2018 – 2020. 
Table 10: Scenario III, IV and V of FTAs 







AUS 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.09
NZL -0.08 -0.09 0.19 -0.13
CHN -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
HKG -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05
JPN 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.31
KOR 0.34 0.33 0.41 0.32
IDN 0.88 0.89 -0.95 0.61
MYS 1.42 1.41 1.37 1.34
PHL 3.27 3.25 3.45 3.28
SGP -0.32 -0.33 -0.18 -0.19
THA 4.49 4.46 6.53 6.05
XSE 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.16
IND 0.63 0.64 1.01 0.96
CAN -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.15
USA -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05
MEX 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.08
EU15 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.12
ROW -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15
Period 2018 - 2020
 
1. See Appendix 3 for region abbreviations. 
2. Author’s simulation, using GTAP database, GTAP-Dyn and GEMPACK. 
  3. Calculated as the deviation from an assumed growth path without policy shocks. 
  Under Scenario III, the Japan – US FTA will bring about very small changes in 
impacts. Japan and the US will increase their GDP in marginal but positive amounts, 
compared to the baseline. The Agriculture Liberalization Scenario will generally increase the 
GDP impacts to the FTA partners with exporting agricultural products, in particular including 
Australia, New Zealand and Thailand. Scenario V, compared to Scenario VI, assumes the US 
will also enjoy the liberalization of the Japanese agriculture sectors. This brings about 
positive impacts on the US GDP, but some trade diversion effects will reduce the positive 
impacts on Australia, New Zealand and Mexico. 
  For Japan, the wider and deeper the liberalization is, the larger the positive impact on 
GDP will materialize. The dynamic gain of GDP under Scenario V will be more than seven 
times. The large increase of GDP under Scenario III – V underlines the significance of the 
liberalization of the agriculture and the related sectors of Japan. 
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4.  Implications from the Study and Remaining Research Issues 
Implications from the Study 
The model study provides the following implications. First, Japan’s three existing 
FTAs may bring about only small benefits. Much larger potential welfare gains are expected 
from the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN10, China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. 
Japan should proceed to expand its FTA partners. Both static and dynamic model simulation 
underscore the importance. 
Second, the earlier formation of Japan’s FTAs will provide both Japan and potential 
FTA partners with larger increases in GDP. The simulation of the dynamic model, which 
incorporates the mechanism of international capital mobility and capital accumulation, 
demonstrates the importance of earlier formation of an FTA, particularly in the case of New 
Zealand and China. 
Third, regional FTAs including Japan will bring about welfare gains to all members in 
the region, while minimizing trade diversion. In consideration of the benefits of forming 
regional production networks, which were not included in the analysis, Japan should seek the 
formation of FTA networks to make them regional. In order to do so, ROOs should be 
harmonized to prevent them from hindering the optimal location of the production process. 
Fourth, preferential trade arrangements, including FTAs, inevitably cause trade 
diversion, especially to non-member countries. Expansion of FTA members in the region will 
reduce the loss to such non-member countries,  and contribute to building achievement 
toward the multi-lateral arrangements. 
Remaining Research Issues 
  The model simulation inevitably faces limitations both from the model technology 
and the availability of data. Particularly, the model adopted in this paper assumes constant 
returns to scale. But in reality, the large part of the effects from trade liberalization may be 
brought about from the scale merits and the economy of agglomeration. The model should 
explore to duly assess such effects in the future. 
  Moreover, an FTA, particularly in the type of the EPA of Japan, includes a wide range 
of liberalization and cooperation measures in the clauses. The CGE models tend to assess 
only tariff reduction. The model should be improved to cover these effects both in theoretical 
and empirical sides. The modelers should also construct the required database. 22 
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Appendix 1: Simplified framework for welfare analysis 
  The text adopts an analytical framework which greatly simplified the formulation by 
Baldwin and Venables (1995). Suppose that the welfare of the representative consumer in a 
country can be represented by an indirect utility function 
) , ( E t p V V + =   where p is a border price vector, t is a vector of import tariff (domestically 
captured rent), and E is total expenditure on consumption. Total expenditure is equal to the 
sum of factor income, profits and domestically accruing trade rents including tariff revenue, 
net of investment. Therefore, 
tm rK wL E + + =   where m is the net import vector. 
  Totally differentiating V and dividing through by the marginal utility of expenditure 
and assuming perfect competition in the market for used capital we find: 
mdp tdm V dV dE E − = ≈ /  
The first term is trade volume effect, and the second, terms of trade effect. 
In the case of tariff elimination the trade volumes effect amounts to the following integral: 













t t t − = − = ≈ ∫ ∫ ∫  
where t0 is the level of import tariff before the tariff elimination, and m0 is the amount of 
import before the tariff elimination. In a partial equilibrium framework, the first term denotes 
the trapezoid sodod1s1, and the second term is the rectangular sodoba in the chart below. The 
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 Appendix 2: Baldwin dynamic specification 
  According to Baldwin (1989, 1992) and Francois, et. al. (1996), the following 
specification is applied to the model of simulation. The first element is an aggregate 
production function linking output (Y ) at time t to the amount of capital (K) and labor (L ) 
employed: 
  Y = F(A, K, L ) 
where  A  is an overall productivity parameter, and the production function F is linearly 
homogeneous and diminishing returns with respect to capital (K) and labor (L). The relation 
between the stock of capital and output is plotted as YY in the figure below. Note the 
curvature of YY reflecting diminishing return to capital when the labor force is held constant. 
 
For a given flow of investment, the capital stock evolves over time according to  
  Kt+1 = (1- δ)  Kt+1 + It 
where δ is the depreciation rate of the capital stock each year, and It  is the flow of gross 
investment. The capital stock will be higher next period if today’s investment is sufficiently 
large to both replace worn out capital and add new units to the stock. To complete the model, 
we must specify how much of current output is set aside for savings and investment. We 
adopt the classical assumption that consumers save a fixed share (s) of income, 
  S = s Yt 25 
 
where  S  is total saving. Abstracting from international capital flows, savings equals to 
investment. Furthermore, since savings depends on income that in turn depends on the capital 
stock, savings depends (indirectly) on the stock of capital. The savings function is plotted as 
SS in the figure. The final relation plotted in figure 1 is DD=δK, the amount of investment 
needed to replace worn out capital in each period. The capital stock grows over time if 
savings and investment are larger than the rate at which capital depreciates (SS > DD), it is 
constant if savings and investment are just enough to replace depreciated capital (SS = DD), 
and it falls otherwise (SS < DD). 
  Starting from a low capital stock with high returns on investment, income will grow 
over time as capital is accumulated through savings and investment. In the absence of 
technical progress, this process will eventually come to an end because of the diminishing 
returns of adding more capital per worker. In the long run, growth in per capita income will 
stop at the point where savings is just enough to replace depreciated capital. The "steady 
state" capital stock and output (distinguished by absence of time subscripts) are eventually 
reached. 
  Now, consider the impact of efficiency-enhancing changes, i.e. tariff reduction in this 
study. We assume that the region we are modeling is initially in a steady-state, and that the 
changes enhances the efficiency of capital and labor by moving resources into sectors where 
they are more valuable at the margin. In the figure, this is represented by an increase in the 
economy-wide productivity parameter A, which shifts out the production function from YY 
to Y'Y' for any given level of capital and labor. That is, the same amount of labor and capital 
can now produce more than before, as illustrated by the difference between Y' and Y in the 
figure. This is the short-run or static gain. Part of the additional income will be saved and 
invested in new capital, which in turn yields an additional income gain. (Note the positive 
difference between S'S' and DD for the initial capital stock K, implying positive net 
investments). The economy will, over time, move up to a new higher steady state capital 
stock and corresponding higher output, marked in the figure by K'' and Y'' respectively. 
Decomposing the total income gain into static and induced (medium-run) gains we have 
  (Y''-Y)/Y = (Y'-Y)/Y + (Y''-Y')/Y 
where the first part is the static income gain and the second part is the induced (medium-run) 
gain. It turns out that the latter is simply a multiple of the static gain. 
  (Y''-Y')/Y = (a/1-a)(Y'-Y)/Y  
That is, for each percentage increase in static income one gets an additional fraction in 
induced income gain over the medium run. (Of course, any policy change that improves 
productivity will induce higher incomes with a savings-investment linkage). The size of the 
induced income gain depends on the curvature of the YY schedule, which in turn depends on 
the elasticity of output with respect to capital, measured by the parameter "a" in the 
production function. The larger the output capital elasticity, the less the curvature of the YY 
schedule, and the larger the induced gain in income. 26 
 
Appendix 3: Sector and Region Aggregation 
1. Sector Aggregation 
# Code Contents
1 GRN Paddy rice; Wheat; Other cereal grains
2C R O P
Vegetables, fruit, nuts; Oil seeds; Sugar cane, sugar beet; Plant-based fibers;
Other crops
3L S K
Cattles; Animal products; Raw milk; Wool, silk-worm cocoons; Meats; Meat
products; Dairy products
4 FRS Forest ry
5 FSH Fishing
6 MNG Coal; Oil; Gas; Other minerals
7F D P
Vegetable oils and fats; Processed rice; Sugar; Other food products; Beverages
and tobacco products.
8 TEX Textiles
9 WAP Wearing apparel; Leather products
10 CHM Petroleum, coal products; Chemical,rubber,plastic prods
11 MET
Mineral products (excluding coal, oil, gas and other extracted minerals); Ferrous
metals; Other metals; Metal products.
12 MVH Motor vehicles and parts.
13 OTN Other transport equipment
14 ELE Electronic equipment
15 OME Other machinery and equipment
16 OMF Wood products; Paper products, publishing; Other manufactures





22 FIN Financial services; Insurance.
23 PRS Other business services; Recreation and other services
24 OFS PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Education
25 DWE Dwellings.  27 
 
2. Region Aggregation 
# Code Countries and Regions
1 AUS Australia
2 NZL New Zealand
3 CHN China







11 SGP Si ngapor e
12 THA Thailand
13 VNM Vietnam
14 XSE Rest of Southeast Asia
15 IND India
16 XSA Bangladesh; Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia
17 CAN Canada
18 USA United States




Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; United Kingdom; Greece;
Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Switzerland
23 RUS Russian Federation; Rest of Former Soviet Union
24 ROW Rest of the World  
 
 